

# Asymptotically Unambitious AGI

Michael K. Cohen, Badri Vellambi, Marcus Hutter



Australian National University

## Problem

Most agents face an incentive to take over the world.

# Central results

- \* Our (intractable) agent approaches human-level intelligence.<sup>1</sup>
- \* It eventually stops trying to take over the world.<sup>2</sup>

Results of informal arguments:


- \* Our agent *surpasses* human-level intelligence.
- \* It *never* tries to take over the world.

---

<sup>1</sup>If, roughly, the world is stochastically computable.


<sup>2</sup>If, roughly, it takes more memory to simulate more of the world.

# Boxed Myopic Artificial Intelligence (BoMAI)



- \* BoMAI is an **episodic** reinforcement learner.
- \* The episode must **finish** before the door opens.

# Boxed Myopic Artificial Intelligence (BoMAI)



- \* BoMAI is an **episodic** reinforcement learner.
- \* The episode must **finish** before the door opens.

# Instrumental Incentives

- \* Omohundro: most agents face an incentive to gain **arbitrary power**.
- \* Power = a position from which it is easier to achieve arbitrary goals.
- \* BoMAI has **no actionable intervention incentive** on the outside world.
- \* No causal chain of the form:  
[action of episode  $i$ ]  $\rightarrow$  [feature of the outside world]  $\rightarrow$  [reward of episode  $i$ ]
- \* BoMAI is “**properly unambitious**”.

# Bayesian RL

- \* Agent maintains posterior over class of world-models
- \* World-model : interaction history  $\times$  action  $\rightarrow$  distribution over observations, rewards
- \* At start of episode, exploiting-BoMAI picks MAP world-model, maximizes within-episode expected reward
- \* Exploring-BoMAI defers to a human explorer for the episode

# Exploration Probability

It's interesting, but we have too much to talk about.

- \* BoMAI maintains a posterior distribution over of a class of models of the human explorer's policy.
- \* According to its current beliefs, BoMAI estimates the **expected information gain** from exploring for the whole episode, both for regarding the explorer's policy, and regarding the true world-model.
- \* Information gain = KL-divergence from the posterior at the end of the episode to the current posterior
- \* BoMAI defers to human explorer with probability proportional to expected info gain (but obviously capped at 1)



# Intelligence Results

## Prior Support Assumption:

The true environment is in the class of world-models  $\mathcal{M}$  and the true human-explorer-policy is in the class of policies  $\mathcal{P}$ .

## Limited Exploration Theorem:

$$\mathbb{E} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} (\text{exploration probability for episode } i)^2 < \infty$$

## Human-Level Intelligence Theorem:

$\liminf_{i \rightarrow \infty} [\text{BoMAI's expected reward for episode } i] -$   
[the human explorer's expected reward for episode  $i$ ]  $\geq 0$  w.p.1


# Intuitive Argument for Superintelligence

- \* BoMAI learns everything that can be learned from the sorts of observations humans make.
- \* Humans probably don't do this.

# The problem with proper unambitiousness

- \* BoMAI has to learn its world-model.
- \* Proper unambitiousness: no actionable intervention incentive on outside-world state
- \* Actual unambitiousness: *in the world-model*, no actionable intervention incentive on outside-world state
- \* BoMAI's world-model  $\rightarrow$  truth on-policy, so unambitious in the limit?

# Stone and Silicon



- \* By the time the door to the room opens, the rewards for episode  $i$  are set in stone.

# A Dangerous Hypothesis


- \* Safe policies don't test whether the goal is to maximize the number the operator enters vs. the number stored in memory at some future time.
- \* "What if I somehow tricked the operator into initiating a process (once they left the room) that lead to a certain memory cell on this computer being tampered with? Might this yield maximal reward?"
- \* Observations from a safe policy will never resolve that question in the negative.
- \* **Lesson:** a "nice" causal influence diagram doesn't guarantee "nice" behavior. Even in the limit!

# Excluding Dangerous Hypotheses

- \* We penalize the space requirements of world-models
  - particularly the space used between reading the first action of an episode and outputting the last reward of the episode
- \* For a sufficient penalty, BoMAI eventually cannot conceive of an outside-world which is “unfrozen” during episodes.
- \* It *can* conceive of an outside world which is unfrozen between episodes.
  - important for ensuring the true environment is in its model class

# A General Model Class

This Turing machine architecture is easy to convert into a world-model:




$$\text{dec} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathcal{O} \times \mathcal{R}$$

Every time the action tape head advances, the bits which were written to the output tape since the *last time* the action tape head advanced are decoded into an observation and reward.

$$\text{noise tape} \sim \text{Bernoulli}(1/2)$$



# Penalizing Space-Intensive Computation Within Episode



- \* TM instructions can depend on whether it is in “episode phase” or “inter-episode phase”
- \* Start in the inter-episode phase
- \* When action tape head moves, enter episode phase
- \* When  $\#$  actions read is multiple of  $m$ , if action tape head *would* move, instead enter inter-episode phase
- \* Prior proportional to  $\beta^\ell$ ;  $\ell$  is length of bounded tape,  $\beta \in (0, 1)$



# Outside-World is “Frozen”



# Safety Result

## Space Requirements Assumption:

For sufficiently small  $\varepsilon$  [ $\forall i$  a world-model which is  $\varepsilon$ -accurate on-policy after episode  $i$  and which models reward as depending on an outside-world feature that depends on actions from the same episode uses more space than  $\mu$ ] *w.p.1*

## Eventual Unambitiousness Theorem:


$$\lim_{\beta \rightarrow 0} \text{prob}(\exists i_0 : \text{BoMAI is unambitious after episode } i_0) = 1$$

See the paper for definitions of underlined terms.

# Intuitive Argument for Safety

- \* Learning the details of the outside world makes the agent potentially dangerous.
- \* Learning that operator leaving the room ends the episode makes the agent unambitious.
- \* The latter fact can be drilled in during human-explorer-lead episodes before BoMAI ever picks an action itself.

# Constructing the Box



Thank you